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Abstract
Many in quantum foundations seek a principle explanation of Bell state
entanglement. While reconstructions of quantum mechanics (QM) have
been produced, the community does not find them compelling. Herein
we offer a principle explanation for Bell state entanglement, i.e., conser-
vation per no preferred reference frame (NPRF), such that NPRF unifies
Bell state entanglement with length contraction and time dilation from
special relativity (SR). What makes this a principle explanation is that
it’s grounded directly in phenomenology, it is an adynamical and acausal
explanation that involves adynamical global constraints as opposed to dy-
namical laws or causal mechanisms, and it’s unifying with respect to QM
and SR.
1 Introduction
Many physicists in quantum information theory (QIT) are calling for “clear
physical principles” [Fuchs and Stacey, 2016] to account for quantum mechanics
(QM). As [Hardy, 2016] points out, “The standard axioms of [quantum theory]
are rather ad hoc. Where does this structure come from?” Fuchs points to the
postulates of special relativity (SR) as an example of what QIT seeks for QM
[Fuchs and Stacey, 2016] and SR is a principle theory [Felline, 2011]. That is,
the postulates of SR are constraints offered without a corresponding constructive
explanation. In what follows, [Einstein, 1919] explains the difference between
the two:
We can distinguish various kinds of theories in physics. Most of
them are constructive. They attempt to build up a picture of the
more complex phenomena out of the materials of a relatively simple
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formal scheme from which they start out. ...
Along with this most important class of theories there exists a sec-
ond, which I will call “principle-theories.” These employ the an-
alytic, not the synthetic, method. The elements which form their
basis and starting point are not hypothetically constructed but em-
pirically discovered ones, general characteristics of natural processes,
principles that give rise to mathematically formulated criteria which
the separate processes or the theoretical representations of them
have to satisfy. ...
The advantages of the constructive theory are completeness, adapt-
ability, and clearness, those of the principle theory are logical perfec-
tion and security of the foundations. The theory of relativity belongs
to the latter class.
It is worth noting the irony that in the past two decades, just as some
have sought a principle explanation of QM, others have sought a constructive
explanation of SR [Brown, 2005, Brown and Pooley, 2006]. While we cannot
go into detail on such matters, we note that reasons for seeking a principle
explanation of QM include not just the ad hoc nature of the postulates, but the
fact that there is no agreement on “constructive interpretations,” in part because
they do nothing but recover what is already in textbook QM, and therefore lead
to no new physics or unification. Indeed, non-local interpretations of QM only
make unification with SR more problematic.
For those who believe the fundamental explanation for QM phenomena must
be constructive, at least in the sense envisioned by Einstein above, none of the
mainstream interpretations neatly fit the bill. Not only do most interpreta-
tions entail some form of QM holism, contextuality, and/or non-locality, the
remainder invoke priority monism and/or multiple branches or outcomes. The
problem with attempting a constructive account of QM is, as articulated by
[Van Camp, 2011], “Constructive interpretations are attempted, but they are
not unequivocally constructive in any traditional sense.” Thus, [Van Camp, 2011]
states:
The interpretive work that must be done is less in coming up with a
constructive theory and thereby explaining puzzling quantum phe-
nomena, but more in explaining why the interpretation counts as
explanatory at all given that it must sacrifice some key aspect of the
traditional understanding of causal-mechanical explanation.
It seems clear all of this would be anathema to Einstein and odious with re-
spect to constructive explanation, especially if say, statistical mechanics is the
paradigm example of constructive explanation. Thus, for many it seems wise to
at least attempt a principle explanation of QM, as sought by QIT. The problem
with QIT’s attempts is noted by [Van Camp, 2011]:
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Figure 1: Answer to Bub’s question, “Why the Tsirelson bound?” The
“constraint” is conservation per no preferred reference frame.
However, nothing additional has been shown to be incorporated into
an information-theoretic reformulation of QM beyond what is con-
tained in QM itself. It is hard to see how it could offer more uni-
fication of the phenomena than QM already does since they are
equivalent, and so it is not offering any explanatory value on this
front.
Nonetheless, QIT continues to seek “the reconstruction of quantum theory”
via a constraint-based/principle approach [Chiribella and Spekkens, 2016]. In-
deed, QIT has produced several different sets of axioms, postulates, and “phys-
ical requirements” in terms of quantum information, which all reproduce quan-
tum theory. Along those lines, [Bub, 2004, Bub, 2012, Bub, 2016] has asked,
“why is the world quantum and not classical, and why is it quantum rather
than superquantum, i.e., why the Tsirelson bound for quantum correlations?”
Despite all the success of QIT, the community does not find any of the
reconstructions compelling. [Cuffaro, 2017], for example, argues that informa-
tion causality needs to be justified in some physical sense. And, as Hardy
states, “When I started on this, what I wanted to see was two or so obvi-
ous, compelling axioms that would give you quantum theory and which no
one would argue with” [Ball, 2017]. Fuchs quotes Wheeler, “If one really un-
derstood the central point and its necessity in the construction of the world,
one ought to state it in one clear, simple sentence” [Fuchs and Stacey, 2016,
p. 302]. Asked if he had such a sentence, Fuchs responded, “No, that’s
my big failure at this point” [Fuchs and Stacey, 2016, p. 302]. As we will
show, the same principle responsible for the postulates of SR is also responsi-
ble for Bell state entanglement which uniquely produces the Tsirelson bound
[Cirel’son, 1980, Landau, 1987, Khalfin and Tsirelson, 1992], viz., no preferred
reference frame (NPRF, aka the relativity principle) (Figure 1).
The term “reference frame” has many meanings in physics related to micro-
scopic and macroscopic phenomena, Galilean versus Lorentz transformations,
relatively moving observers, etc. The difference between Galilean and Lorentz
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transformations resides in the fact that the speed of light is finite, so NPRF
entails the light postulate of SR, i.e., that everyone measure the same speed of
light c, regardless of their motion relative to the source. If there was only one
reference frame for a source in which the speed of light equaled the prediction
from Maxwell’s equations (c = 1√µoo ), then that would certainly constitute a
preferred reference frame. Herein, we extend NPRF to include the measurement
of another fundamental constant of nature, Planck’s constant h (= 2pih¯).
As Steven Weinberg points out, measuring an electron’s spin via Stern-
Gerlach (SG) magnets constitutes the measurement of “a universal constant
of nature, Planck’s constant” [Weinberg, 2017, p. 3] (Figure 2). So if NPRF
applies equally here, everyone must measure the same value for Planck’s con-
stant h regardless of their SG magnet orientations relative to the source, which
like the light postulate is an empirical fact. By “relative to the source” of a pair
of spin-entangled particles, we mean relative “to the vertical in the plane per-
pendicular to the line of flight of the particles” [Mermin, 1981, p. 943] (Figure
3). Here the possible spin outcomes ± h¯2 represent a fundamental (indivisible)
unit of information per Dakic and Brukner’s first axiom in their reconstruction
of quantum theory, “An elementary system has the information carrying capac-
ity of at most one bit” [Dakic and Brukner, 2009]. Thus, different SG magnet
orientations relative to the source constitute different “reference frames” in QM
just as different velocities relative to the source constitute different “reference
frames” in SR. Borrowing from [Einstein, 1936], NPRF might be stated:
No one’s “sense experiences,” to include measurement outcomes, can
provide a privileged perspective on the “real external world.”
This is consistent with the notion of symmetries per [Hicks, 2019]:
There are not two worlds in one of which I am here and in the other
I am three feet to the left, with everything else similarly shifted.
Instead, there is just this world and two mathematical descriptions of
it. The fact that those descriptions put the origin at different places
does not indicate any difference between the worlds, as the origin
in our mathematical description did not correspond to anything in
the world anyway. The symmetries tell us what structure the world
does not have.
That is, there is just one “real external world” harboring many, but always equal
perspectives as far as the physics is concerned [Silberstein and Stuckey, 2020].
We have shown elsewhere that the quantum correlations and quantum states
corresponding to the Bell states, which uniquely produce the Tsirelson bound
for the Clauser–Horne–Shimony–Holt (CHSH) quantity, can be derived from
conservation per NPRF [Stuckey et al., 2019]. Thus, Bell state entanglement is
ultimately grounded in NPRF just as SR [Stuckey et al., 2020]. As summarized
in Figure 1, the quantum correlations responsible for the Tsirelson bound satisfy
conservation per NPRF while both classical and superquantum correlations can
violate this constraint. Therefore a principle explanation of Bell state entangle-
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Figure 2: A Stern-Gerlach (SG) spin measurement showing the two possible
outcomes, up (+ h¯2 ) and down (− h¯2 ) or +1 and −1, for short. The important
point to note here is that the classical analysis predicts all possible deflections,
not just the two that are observed. This binary (quantum) outcome reflects
Dakic and Brukner’s first axiom in their reconstruction of quantum theory, “An
elementary system has the information carrying capacity of at most one bit”
[Dakic and Brukner, 2009]. The difference between the classical prediction and
the quantum reality uniquely distinguishes the quantum joint distribution from
the classical joint distribution for the Bell spin states [Garg and Mermin, 1982].
Figure 3: Alice and Bob making spin measurements on a pair of spin-entangled
particles with their Stern-Gerlach (SG) magnets and detectors in the xz-plane.
Here Alice and Bob’s SG magnets are not aligned so these measurements repre-
sent different reference frames. Since their outcomes satisfy Dakic and Brukner’s
Axiom 1 in all reference frames and satisfy explicit conservation of spin angular
momentum in the same reference frame, they can only satisfy conservation of
spin angular momentum on average in different reference frames.
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ment and the Tsirelson bound that be stated in “one clear, simple sentence” is
“conservation per no preferred reference frame” (Figure 1).
What qualifies as a principle explanation versus constructive turns out to be
a fraught and nuanced question [Felline, 2011] and we do not want to be side-
tracked on that issue as such. Let us therefore state explicitly that what makes
our explanation a principle one is that it is grounded directly in phenomenology,
it is an adynamical and acausal explanation that involves adynamical global con-
straints as opposed to dynamical laws or causal mechanisms, and it is unifying
with respect to QM and SR.
Let us also note that while contrary to certain others [Brown, 2005, Brown and Pooley, 2006,
Norton, 2008, Menon, 2019], we are arguing that conservation per NPRF need
not ever be discharged by a constructive explanation or interpretation. This is
at least partially distinct from the question in SR for example, of whether facts
about physical geometry are grounded in facts about dynamical fields or vice-
versa. Furthermore, this principle explanation is consistent with any number of
“constructive interpretations” of QM. For example, this principle explanation
avoids the complaints about Bub’s proposed principle explanation of QM leveled
by [Felline, 2018]. That is, the principle being posited herein does not require
a solution to the measurement problem nor again does it necessarily beg for a
constructive counterpart.
In Section 2 we provide a quick review of length contraction, time dilation,
the relativity of simultaneity, and Lorentz transformations per SR. In Section
3 we explain how conservation per NPRF is responsible for Bell state entangle-
ment in complete analogy with the light postulate. In Section 4 we argue that
principle explanation for these mysteries suffices despite the fact that there is
no constructive counterpart.
2 NPRF and Special Relativity
Suppose there are three women moving together at 0.6c with respect to two
men. The men and women agree on the details of the following four Events
(men’s coordinates are lower case and women’s coordinates are upper case):
• Event 1: Joe meets Sara at X1 = x1 = 0, T1 = t1 = 0.
• Event 2: Bob meets Kim at X2 = 1250km, T2 = −0.0025s, x2 = 1000km,
t2 = 0.
• Event 3: Bob meets Alice at X3 = 800km, T3 = 0, x3 = 1000km, t3 =
0.002s.
• Event 4: Bob meets Sara at X4 = 0, T4 = 0.0044s, x4 = 1000km, t4 =
0.0055s.
The lower-case and upper-case coordinates for each Event are related by Lorentz
transformations with γ = 1.25. Here is the story according to the men.
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Figure 4: Events 1 and 2 are simultaneous for the men and are spaced at a
distance of 1000km. The women say the distance between Sara and Kim is
1250km. Thus, the men say the women’s meter sticks are short.
The women are moving in the positive x direction at 0.6c. Events 1 and
2 are simultaneous (t1 = t2 = 0), so the distance between Sara and Kim is
x2 = 1000km. The women say the distance between Sara and Kim is X2 =
1250km, so their proper distance has been length contracted by γ (Figure 4).
Event 4 happens t4 = 0.0055s after Events 1 and 2, but Sara’s clock has only
ticked off T4 = 0.0044s, so her proper time has been dilated by a factor of γ
(Figure 5). Therefore, the men say the women’s meter sticks are short (length
contraction) and the women’s clocks are running slow (time dilation). Here is
the story according to the women.
The men are moving in the negative X direction at 0.6c. Events 1 and 3 are
simultaneous (T1 = T3 = 0), not Events 1 and 2 as the men claim (relativity
of simultaneity). Thus, the distance between Joe and Bob is X3 = 800km, not
x3 = 1000km as the men claim (Figure 6). Again, the proper distance has been
length contracted by γ. Event 3 happens 0.0025s after Event 2, but Bob’s clock
has only ticked off t3 = 0.002s, so his proper time has been dilated by a factor
of γ (Figure 6). Therefore, the women say the men’s meter sticks are short and
the men’s clocks are running slow.
In summary, NPRF gives the postulates of SR whence the Lorentz trans-
formations, time dilation, length contraction, and the relativity of simultaneity.
Since Alice and Bob always measure the same speed of light c regardless of their
relative motion per NPRF, Alice says Bob’s temporal and spatial measurements
need to be corrected per time dilation and length contraction while Bob says
the same thing about Alice’s measurements. But, if NPRF is true and funda-
mental, then neither need to be corrected (relativity of simultaneity). Thus,
the mysteries of length contraction and time dilation in SR ultimately reside
in NPRF starting with the fact that everyone measures the same value for the
fundamental constant c. Now let us relate this mystery to the mystery of Bell
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Figure 5: According to the men, Event 4 happens t4 = 0.0055s after Events 1
and 2, but Sara’s clock has only ticked off T4 = 0.0044s. Thus, the men say the
women’s clocks are running slow.
Figure 6: According to the women, Events 1 and 3 are simultaneous not Events
1 and 2 as the men claim (relativity of simultaneity). Thus, the distance between
Joe and Bob is X3 = 800km, not x3 = 1000km as the men claim, i.e., the women
say the men’s meter sticks are short. Also, Event 3 happens 0.0025s after Event
2, but Bob’s clock has only ticked off t3 = 0.002s, so the women say the men’s
clocks are running slow.
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state entanglement in QM.
3 Conservation per NPRF in QM
The Bell states are
|ψ−〉 = |ud〉 − |du〉√
2
|ψ+〉 = |ud〉+ |du〉√
2
|φ−〉 = |uu〉 − |dd〉√
2
|φ+〉 = |uu〉+ |dd〉√
2
(1)
in the eigenbasis of σz. The first state |ψ−〉 is called the “spin singlet state”
and it represents a total conserved spin angular momentum of zero (S = 0) for
the two particles involved. The other three states are called the “spin triplet
states” and they each represent a total conserved spin angular momentum of one
(S = 1, in units of h¯ = 1 for spin- 12 particles). In all four cases, the entanglement
represents the conservation of spin angular momentum for the process creating
the state.
If Alice is making her spin measurement σ1 in the aˆ direction and Bob is
making his spin measurement σ2 in the bˆ direction, we have
σ1 = aˆ · ~σ = axσx + ayσy + azσz
σ2 = bˆ · ~σ = bxσx + byσy + bzσz (2)
The correlation functions are given by [Stuckey et al., 2020]
〈ψ−|σ1σ2|ψ−〉 = −axbx − ayby − azbz
〈ψ+|σ1σ2|ψ+〉 = axbx + ayby − azbz
〈φ−|σ1σ2|φ−〉 = −axbx + ayby + azbz
〈φ+|σ1σ2|φ+〉 = axbx − ayby + azbz
(3)
The spin singlet state is invariant under all three SU(2) transformations
meaning we obtain opposite outcomes ( 12 ud and
1
2 du) for SG magnets at any
aˆ = bˆ (Figures 2 & 3) and a correlation function of − cos(θ) in any plane of
physical space, where θ is the angle between aˆ and bˆ (Eq. (3)). We see that the
conserved spin angular momentum (S = 0), being directionless, is conserved in
any plane of physical space. Again, aˆ = bˆ means Alice and Bob are in the same
reference frame.
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The invariance of each of the spin triplet states under its respective SU(2)
transformation in Hilbert space represents the SO(3) invariant conservation of
spin angular momentum S = 1 for each of the planes xz (|φ+〉), yz (|φ−〉),
and xy (|ψ+〉) in physical space. Specifically, when the SG magnets are aligned
(the measurements are being made in the same reference frame) anywhere in
the respective plane of symmetry the outcomes are always the same ( 12 uu and
1
2 dd). It is a planar conservation and our experiment would determine which
plane. If you want to model a conserved S = 1 for some other plane, you simply
create a superposition, i.e., expand in the spin triplet basis. And in that plane,
you’re right back to the mystery of Bell state entanglement per conserved spin
angular momentum via a correlation function of cos(θ), as with any of the spin
triplet states (Eq. (3)).
We will explain the spin singlet state correlation function, since the spin
triplet state correlation function is analogous. That we have opposite outcomes
when Alice and Bob are in the same reference frame is not difficult to understand
via conservation of spin angular momentum, because Alice and Bob’s measured
values of spin angular momentum cancel directly when aˆ = bˆ (Figure 3). But,
when Bob’s SG magnets are rotated by θ relative to Alice’s SG magnets, we
need to clarify the situation.
We have two subsets of data, Alice’s set (with SG magnets at angle α) and
Bob’s set (with SG magnets at angle β). They were collected in N pairs (data
events) with Bob’s(Alice’s) SG magnets at α− β = θ relative to Alice’s(Bob’s).
We want to compute the correlation function for these N data events which is
〈α, β〉 = (+1)A(−1)B + (+1)A(+1)B + (−1)A(−1)B + ...
N
(4)
Now partition the numerator into two equal subsets per Alice’s equivalence
relation, i.e., Alice’s +1 results and Alice’s −1 results
〈α, β〉 = (+1)A(
∑
BA+) + (−1)A(
∑
BA-)
N
(5)
where
∑
BA+ is the sum of all of Bob’s results (event labels) corresponding
to Alice’s +1 result (event label) and
∑
BA- is the sum of all of Bob’s results
(event labels) corresponding to Alice’s −1 result (event label). Notice this is all
independent of the formalism of QM. Next, rewrite Eq. (5) as
〈α, β〉 = 1
2
(+1)ABA+ +
1
2
(−1)ABA− (6)
with the overline denoting average. Notice that to understand the quantum
correlation responsible for Bell state entanglement, we need to understand the
origins of BA+ and BA− for the Bell states. We now show what that is for the
spin singlet state [Unnikrishnan, 2005], the spin triplet states are analogous in
their respective symmetry planes [Stuckey et al., 2020].
In classical physics, one would say the projection of the spin angular mo-
mentum vector of Alice’s particle ~SA = +1aˆ along bˆ is ~SA · bˆ = + cos(θ) where
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SB
b

proj
b
^SB
θ
Figure 7: The spin angular momentum of Bob’s particle ~SB = −~SA projected
along his measurement direction bˆ. This does not happen with spin angular
momentum.
again θ is the angle between the unit vectors aˆ and bˆ. That’s because the pre-
diction from classical physics is that all values between +1
(
h¯
2
)
and −1 ( h¯2 ) are
possible outcomes for a spin measurement (Figure 2). From Alice’s perspective,
had Bob measured at the same angle, i.e., β = α, he would have found the
spin angular momentum vector of his particle was ~SB = −~SA = −1aˆ, so that
~SA + ~SB = ~STotal = 0. Since he did not measure the spin angular momentum
of his particle at the same angle, he should have obtained a fraction of the
length of ~SB , i.e., ~SB · bˆ = −1aˆ · bˆ = − cos(θ) (Figure 7; this also follows from
counterfactual spin measurements on the single-particle state [Boughn, 2017]).
Of course, Bob only ever obtains +1 or −1, but suppose that Bob’s outcomes
average − cos(θ) (Figure 8). This means
BA+ = − cos(θ) (7)
Likewise, for Alice’s (−1)A results we have
BA− = cos(θ) (8)
Putting these into Eq. (6) we obtain
〈α, β〉 = 1
2
(+1)A(− cos(θ)) + 1
2
(−1)A(cos(θ)) = − cos(θ) (9)
which is precisely the correlation function given by QM for the spin singlet state.
Notice that Eqs. (7) & (8) are mathematical facts for obtaining the quantum
correlation function, we are simply motivating these facts via conservation of
spin angular momentum in accord with the SU(2) Bell state invariances. Of
course, Bob could partition the data according to his equivalence relation (per
his reference frame) and claim that it is Alice who must average her results
(obtained in her reference frame) to conserve angular momentum (Figure 8).
We posit that the reason we have average-only conservation in different ref-
erence frames is ultimately due to NPRF. To motivate NPRF for the Bell states,
consider the empirical facts. First, Bob and Alice both measure ±1 ( h¯2 ) for all
SG magnet orientations, i.e. in all reference frames. In order to satisfy conser-
vation of spin angular momentum for any given trial when Alice and Bob are
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Figure 8: Average View for the Spin Singlet State. Reading from left to
right, as Bob rotates his SG magnets relative to Alice’s SG magnets for her +1
outcome, the average value of his outcome varies from −1 (totally down, arrow
bottom) to 0 to +1 (totally up, arrow tip). This obtains per conservation of spin
angular momentum on average in accord with no preferred reference frame. Bob
can say exactly the same about Alice’s outcomes as she rotates her SG magnets
relative to his SG magnets for his +1 outcome. That is, their outcomes can only
satisfy conservation of spin angular momentum on average in different reference
frames, because they only measure ±1, never a fractional result. Thus, just as
with the light postulate of SR, we see that no preferred reference frame leads
to a counterintuitive result. Here it requires quantum outcomes ±1 ( h¯2 ) for all
measurements and that leads to the mystery of “average-only” conservation.
making different measurements, i.e., when they are in different reference frames,
it would be necessary for Bob or Alice to measure some fraction, ± cos(θ). For
example, if Alice measured +1 at α = 0 for an S = 1 state (in the plane of sym-
metry) and Bob made his measurement (in the plane of symmetry) at β = 60◦,
then Bob’s outcome would need to be 12 (Figure 9). In that case, we would
know that Alice measured the “true” spin angular momentum of her particle
(and therefore the “true” value of Planck’s constant) while Bob only measured
a component of the “true” spin angular momentum for his particle. Thus, Al-
ice’s SG magnet orientation would definitely constitute a “preferred reference
frame.”
But, this is precisely what does not happen. Alice and Bob both always
measure ±1 ( h¯2 ), no fractions, in accord with NPRF for the measurement of
Planck’s constant. And, this fact alone distinguishes the quantum joint distri-
bution from the classical joint distribution [Garg and Mermin, 1982] (Figure 2).
Therefore, the average-only conservation responsible for the correlation function
for the Bell states is actually conservation resulting from NPRF.
4 Principle versus Constructive Explanation for
Bell State Entanglement
As we saw in Section 2 for SR, if Alice is moving at velocity ~Va relative to a light
source, then she measures the speed of light from that source to be c (= 1√µoo ,
as predicted by Maxwell’s equations). If Bob is moving at velocity ~Vb relative
to that same light source, then he measures the speed of light from that source
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Figure 9: A spatiotemporal ensemble of 8 experimental trials for the spin triplet
states showing Bob’s outcomes corresponding to Alice’s +1 outcomes when θ =
60◦. Spin angular momentum is not conserved in any given trial, because there
are two different measurements being made, i.e., outcomes are in two different
reference frames, but it is conserved on average for all 8 trials (six up outcomes
and two down outcomes average to cos 60◦ = 12 ). It is impossible for spin angular
momentum to be conserved explicitly in any given trial since the measurement
outcomes are binary (quantum) with values of +1 (up) or −1 (down) per no
preferred reference frame and explicit conservation of spin angular momentum
in different reference frames would require a fractional outcome for Alice and/or
Bob.
to be c. Here “reference frame” refers to the relative motion of the observer
and source, so all observers who share the same relative velocity with respect
to the source occupy the same reference frame. NPRF in this context means all
measurements produce the same outcome c.
As a consequence of this constraint we have time dilation and length con-
traction, which are then reconciled per NPRF via the relativity of simultaneity.
That is, Alice and Bob each partition spacetime per their own equivalence rela-
tions (per their own reference frames), so that equivalence classes are their own
surfaces of simultaneity. If Alice’s equivalence relation over the spacetime events
yields the “true” partition of spacetime, then Bob must correct his lengths and
times per length contraction and time dilation. Of course, the relativity of si-
multaneity says that Bob’s equivalence relation is as valid as Alice’s per NPRF.
This is completely analogous to QM, where Alice and Bob each partition
the data per their own equivalence relations (per their own reference frames),
so that equivalence classes are their own +1 and −1 data events. If Alice’s
equivalence relation over the data events yields the “true” partition of the data,
then Bob must correct (average) his results per average-only conservation. Of
course, NPRF says that Bob’s equivalence relation is as valid as Alice’s, which
we might call the “relativity of data partition” (Table 1).
Thus, the mysteries of SR (time dilation and length contraction) ultimately
follow from the same principle as Bell state entanglement, i.e., no preferred ref-
erence frame. So, if one accepts SR’s principle explanation of time dilation and
length contraction, then they should have no problem accepting conservation
per NPRF as a principle explanation of Bell state entanglement. Thus, the
relativity principle (NPRF) is a unifying principle for non-relativistic QM and
SR, thereby addressing the desideratum of QIT in general and answering Bub’s
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Special Relativity Quantum Mechanics
Empirical Fact: Alice and Bob both
measure c, regardless of their
motion relative to the source
Empirical Fact: Alice and Bob both
measure ±1 ( h¯2 ), regardless of their
SG orientation relative to the source
Alice(Bob) says of Bob(Alice): Must
correct time and length
measurements
Alice(Bob) says of Bob(Alice): Must
average results
NPRF: Relativity of simultaneity NPRF: Relativity of data partition
Table 1: Comparing SR with QM according to no preferred reference
frame (NPRF).
question specifically (Figure 1).
Despite the fact that this principle explanation supplies a unifying frame-
work for both non-relativistic QM and SR, some might demand a constructive
explanation with its corresponding “knowledge of how things in the world work,
that is, of the mechanisms (often hidden) that produce the phenomena we want
to understand” [Salmon, 1993, p. 15]. This is “the causal/mechanical view of
scientific explanation” per [Salmon, 1993, p. 15]. Thus, as with SR, not ev-
eryone will consider our principle account to be explanatory since, “By its very
nature such a theory-of-principle explanation will have nothing to say about
the reality behind the phenomenon” [Balashov and Janssen, 2003, p. 331]. As
stated by [Brown and Pooley, 2006, p. 76]:
What has been shown is that rods and clocks must behave in quite
particular ways in order for the two postulates to be true together.
But this hardly amounts to an explanation of such behaviour. Rather
things go the other way around. It is because rods and clocks behave
as they do, in a way that is consistent with the relativity principle,
that light is measured to have the same speed in each inertial frame.
In other words, the assumption is that the true or fundamental “explanation”
of Bell state entanglement must be a constructive one in the sense of adverting to
causal mechanisms like fundamental physical entities such as particles or fields
and their dynamical equations of motion. Notice that while our account of
SR is in terms of fundamental principle explanation, that does not necessarily
make it a “geometric” interpretation of SR. For example, nothing we’ve said
commits us to the claim that if one were to remove all the matter-energy out
of the universe there would be some geometric structure remaining such as
Minkowski spacetime. Furthermore, there is nothing inherently geometric about
our principle explanation of Bell state entanglement in particular or of NPRF
in general.
Of course we do not have a no-go argument that our principle explanation
will never be subsumed by a constructive one. However, especially in light of
the unifying nature of our principle explanation, we think it is worth considering
the possibility that principle explanation is fundamental in these cases and per-
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haps others [Silberstein et al., 2018, Stuckey et al., 2019, Stuckey et al., 2020].
We think this is especially reasonable in light of the current impasse in both
QIT-based explanations of QM phenomena and in attempts at constructive in-
terpretations. Essentially, we are in a situation with QM that Einstein found
himself in with SR [Einstein, 1949, pp. 51-52]:
By and by I despaired of the possibility of discovering the true laws
by means of constructive efforts based on known facts. The longer
and the more despairingly I tried, the more I came to the conviction
that only the discovery of a universal formal principle could lead us
to assured results. The example I saw before me was thermodynam-
ics.
Thus we are offering a competing account of quantum entanglement for
any interpretation that fundamentally explains entanglement in the constructive
sense. As Einstein said, this gives us the advantage of “logical perfection and se-
curity of the foundations” as our principle account could be true across a number
of different constructive interpretations. And, the principle we offer, NPRF, is a
unifying principle for non-relativistic QM and SR that holds throughout physics
[Silberstein and Stuckey, 2020]. As Pauli once stated [Heisenberg, 1971, p. 33]:
‘Understanding’ probably means nothing more than having what-
ever ideas and concepts are needed to recognize that a great many
different phenomena are part of a coherent whole.
Per [Hicks, 2019], NPRF is a principle that is accessible (“because it is sim-
ple”) and whence we can “infer lots of truths.” Inferring “lots of truths” implies
a unifying principle is superior to its subsumed constituents, since it implies (at
minimum) more truths than any proper subset of its subsumed constituents.
The point is, we are hypothesizing that the SO(3) symmetry with average-only
conservation as an explanation of Bell state entanglement, and Lorentz sym-
metry with relativity of simultaneity as an explanation of length contraction
and time dilation, are expressions of a deeper truth, NPRF, with seemingly
disparate multiple physical consequences. It has been suggested that perhaps
other unresolved phenomena in physics might be explained in a similar fashion
[Silberstein et al., 2018].
The bottom line is that a compelling constraint (who would argue with
conservation per NPRF?) explains Bell state entanglement without any obvious
corresponding ‘dynamical/causal influence’ or hidden variables to account for
the results on a trial-by-trial basis. By accepting this principle explanation
as fundamental, the lack of a compelling, consensus constructive explanation
is not a problem. This is just one of many mysteries in physics created by
dynamical and causal biases that can be resolved by constraint-based thinking
[Silberstein et al., 2018].
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